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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 













THE MERCER COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; JOHN A. KEMLER, 
Individually and under color of state law as Sheriff of the mercer County Sheriff 
Department; RICHARD PIOTROWSKI, Individually and under color of  state law as, 
Chief sheriff Officer for the Mercer County Sheriff Department; SCOTT 
SCHOELLKOPF, Individually and under color of state law as Lieutenant for the Mercer 
County Sheriff Department; DARRYL TAYLOR, Individually and under color of state 
law as Sergeant for the Mercer County Sheriff Department; DONALD PATUKULA, 
Individually and under color of state law as Sergeant for the Mercer County Sheriff 
Department; CHARLES WERTS, Individually and under color of state law as Sergeant 
for the Mercer County Sheriff Department; CAROL NOLAN, Individually and under 
color of state law as Sergeant for the Mercer County Sheriff Department; SETH 
BARTON, Individually  and under color of state law as Sergeant for the Mercer County 
Sheriff Department; THE COUNTY OF MERCER; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; 
ANDREW A. MAIR, Individually and under color of state law as Mercer County 
Administrator for the Mercer County; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-99, (fictitious names); 
XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-10,  County or governmental entities and their supervisors and 
employees; PBA LOCAL187    
 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-11-cv-07620) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 




Before: McKEE, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 






McKEE, Circuit Judge 
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in an employment 
discrimination lawsuit. The plaintiff, Gloria Anderson, alleged discrimination and 
retaliation claims against the Mercer County Sheriff Department. We will affirm. 
I. 
Summary judgment should be awarded when the moving party demonstrates that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the record evidence demonstrates the 
moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.1 A factual issue is genuine if a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant and is material if it would 
affect the outcome of the lawsuit.2 
Two of the plaintiff’s claims are based on race and gender discrimination under 
Title VII.  Both of those claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas3 burden-
shifting framework. Under that test, the plaintiff must first show that (1) she is a member 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 
2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
3 
 
of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for the position in question; (3) she suffered from 
an adverse employment action; and (4) the employer sought to or did fill the position 
with a similarly qualified person who was not a member of the protected class.4 A 
plaintiff must provide evidence to satisfy each of these prongs in order to establish a 
prima facie case.  
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because 
it found that Anderson had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she 
suffered an adverse employment action.5 An “adverse employment action” under Title 
VII is “an action by an employer that is ‘serious and tangible enough to alter an 
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’”6 Such an 
action must constitute “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits.”7 
On appeal, Anderson contends that the District Court “failed to recognize the 
plethora of material facts”8 supporting her claim.  She seems to argue that she suffered an 
adverse employment action when she was transferred to the Criminal Court Security 
Unit.9 She argues that this lateral transfer constituted an adverse action because the 
 
4 See id. at 802. 
5 JA 11–12.  
6 Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Cardenas v. 
Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
7 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).  
8 Br. for Appellant, 14. 
9 Id. at 17. 
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criminal courthouse was apparently contaminated with asbestos and she provided a 
doctor’s note stating that such a transfer would be detrimental to her health. 
We agree with the District Court that, under the circumstances here, Anderson has 
not alleged that the transfer constitutes an adverse employment action because it did not 
cause a significant change in her employment status. Approximately fifteen other officers 
were transferred at this same time, and Anderson does not allege that her responsibilities 
at the criminal courthouse were significantly different from the functions of other 
sheriffs.  
Concerning her claim about asbestos, the record shows that Anderson was 
transferred in 2010, but her deposition testimony about potentially asbestos-related 
symptoms centers on events that occurred around April 2012.10 Thus, the transfer 
occurred well before any issues arose about asbestos. We therefore agree with the District 
Court’s conclusion that there is no factual dispute about whether or not she suffered an 
adverse employment action.11  
II. 
 
10 See JA 206–08. Anderson’s lawyer indicated that she would “check into” medical 
records before 2012, but nothing additional appears in the record. Anderson’s complaint 
and appellate brief contain several other allegations of misconduct. It is difficult to parse 
the relevance of many of these claims, in part because the complaint was initially filed 
pro se. But the counseled brief does little to clarify how the conflicts detailed therein 
ultimately relate to Anderson’s claims of discrimination and retaliation. 
11 Anderson also claims that she was deprived of the opportunity to earn overtime pay, 
and that preference for overtime positions were given to White officers. We agree with 




Anderson also raised a retaliation claim under Title VII. To establish a prima facie 
case of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must produce evidence that “(1) she engaged in 
activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action 
against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”12 Anderson claims that the 
defendant retaliated against her after she filed a complaint alleging discrimination. But, as 
the District Court found, this claim also fails because there is no evidence that Anderson 
ever suffered from an adverse employment action. She was never disciplined, nor was her 
rank or salary reduced.13 Her role at the Criminal Courthouse fell under the normal job 
description of a sheriff.  In short, there was no adverse employment action and we will 
therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.14 
 
12 Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Nelson v. 
Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)).  
13 See Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
14 We also agree that the state law claims under New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee 
Protection Act are untimely.  
